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Abstract
Whatever Media Studies 2.0 involves, one thing is certain, there is a need to 
confront and deal with new technologies, most notably computers and com-
puter networks. Despite the fact that the discipline has largely marginalized 
these  innovations, there has been some effort to incorporate the computer into 
both the theories and  practices of media studies. This has been accomplished, 
at least in the United States, through the development of what is now called 
 computer-mediated communication (CMC). CMC, which effectively understands 
the computer as a medium of human communication, does not necessarily 
institute a significant paradigm shift in media studies but accommodates the 
new technologies to existing structures, methodologies, and models. This essay 
contests and critiques this approach. It reviews the development of CMC, iden-
tifies its structural limitations, and provides an alternative understanding of 
the computer that has the potential to reorient the discipline in a much more 
radical fashion.  
Let’s begin at the end, with a statement about the end that will only be 
able to be properly understood at the end: the computer, despite every-
thing we now read about new media, media convergence, and digital this 
and that, is neither a new form of mediated communication; an elabora-
tion, continuation, and confluence of previous media technologies; nor a 
new tool in the arsenal of media production and distribution. Instead it 
constitutes the end of media as we have known it. In other word, the 
computer marks the end not just of a particular form of media, as has 
often been argued by scholars of both literacy and media studies (Bolter 
2001; Bolter and Grusin 1999; McLuhan 1995; Ong 1995), but of a par-
ticular and paradigmatic concept of media such. I write this not to be 
controversial or fashionable, even though I recognize that such a statement 
is in fact not without considerable controversy and, from the perspective 
of a particular brand of theory that appends the prefix post- to virtually 
everything (i.e., post-modern, post-industrial, and even post-media), 
appears to be following what many would perceive to be a kind of intel-
lectual haut couture. Instead I write this out of a deep and serious com-
mitment to the study of media and the discipline of what has been called 
media studies. 
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Introduction
When employed for the purposes of communication, the computer has 
customarily been assigned one of two possible functions, both of which 
are dictated by a particular understanding of the process of communica-
tion. The computer has either been defined as a medium through which 
human interlocutors exchange information, or it has occupied, with 
varying degrees of success, the position of the other in communicative 
exchanges, becoming a participant with which human users interact. 
These two alternatives were initially formalized and distinguished in 
Robert Cathcart and Gary Gumpert’s 1985 essay ‘The Person-Computer 
Interaction.’ In this text, the authors differentiate communicating through 
a computer from communicating with a computer. The former, they 
argue, names all those ‘computer facilitated functions’ where ‘the com-
puter is interposed between sender and receiver.’ The latter designates 
‘person-computer interpersonal functions’ where ‘one party activates a 
computer which in turn responds appropriately in graphic, alphanumeric, 
or vocal modes establishing an ongoing sender/receiver relationship’ 
(Cathcart and Gumpert 1985: 114). These two alternatives were corro-
borated and further refined in James Chesebro and Donald Bonsall’s 1989 
book, Computer-Mediated Communication. In this extended examination 
of the role and function of the computer, the authors detail a five-point 
scale that delimits the range of possibilities for ‘computer-human com-
munication.’ The scale extends from the computer utilized as a mere 
medium of transmission between human interlocutors to the computer 
understood as an intelligent agent with whom human users interact. 
Although providing a more complex articulation of the intervening pos-
sibilities, Chesebro and Bonsall’s formulation remains bounded by the 
two possibilities initially identified by Cathcart and Gumpert. 
These two alternatives, which were originally associated with the 
prepositions through and with, effectively situate the computer in one of 
two positions. The computer either is a medium of communication 
through which human users exchange information, or it constitutes an 
Other with whom one communicates. Despite the early identification of 
these two alternatives, the field of media studies has, for better or worse, 
privileged one term over and against the other. With very few exceptions, 
media studies research has decided to address the computer as a medium 
through which human users interact with one another. This decision is 
immediately evident in and has been institutionalized by the relatively 
new field of computer-mediated communication, or CMC. CMC is rou-
tinely defined as any form of communication between human users that 
takes place through, or is facilitated by, some form of computer technol-
ogy. With CMC, therefore, the computer is understood as a medium or 
instrument through which human users exchange messages and interact 
with each other. In this way, CMC does not necessarily institute anything 
new within the discipline of media studies but accommodates these new 
technologies to existing structures, methodologies, and models. Defining 
the computer in this manner is completely reasonable and possesses 
distinct theoretical advantages. At the same time, however, this approach 
limits our understanding of the computer, restricting it to only one of the 
two options initially identified by Cathcart and Gumpert.
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The Origins of CMC
Understanding and defining the computer as a medium of communication 
is a direct result of experiences with timeshared mainframe computers and 
early experiments with computer networking. First generation and early 
second generation mainframe computers like the UNIVAC and the IBM 650 
and System/360 employed what computer scientists call ‘batch processing.’ 
Because these machines were designed to execute one job at a time, users 
were required to run their programs in batches, each particular job run-
ning from start to finish in its entirety (Kemeny 1971). Timesharing, a 
conglomeration of several conceptual and technological developments, 
dramatically altered this situation. In timesharing, the central computer is 
designed to be used by many simultaneous users, each accessing the 
machine remotely by using ‘dumb terminals’ comprised of a CRT display 
and keyboard (McCarthy 1962). Although timeshared systems were initially 
designed to permit concurrent access to and simultaneous use of a single 
computer, giving each individual the illusion that s/he was the sole user of 
the apparatus, operators and system administrators quickly discovered 
that this type of shared usage allowed for two kinds of communication 
between users.
One system, eventually called ‘chat’, provided users with a kind of syn-
chronous interpersonal and even broadcast form of communication. In 
chat, users exchange information in text form by typing messages on their 
keyboard. Because each keyboard in a timeshared system is connected to 
and communicates with a common computer, the keystrokes entered by 
one user can be simultaneously displayed on any number of CRTs wired 
into the system. Additionally, because each user of the central computer is 
assigned a separate log-in identifier, one can employ the computer’s own 
administrative system to discriminate between users, allowing the sender 
of a message to specify the destination or ‘address’ of the intended receiver(s). 
The earliest chat programs were designed to transmit messages between 
two users, creating a kind of interpersonal communication through the 
medium of the computer. Later enhancements supported the distribution 
of messages to more than one user, which allowed for the broadcasting of 
messages and information. The introduction and development of this form 
of computer-mediated communication illustrates William Gibson’s (1993) 
insight that ‘the street finds its own use for things’ (1993: 23). Chat 
programs, at least initially, were not designed and developed by the 
manufacturers of mainframe computers. Instead they were invented and 
implemented by users and administrators of these timeshared systems.
The second form of computer-mediated communication fostered by 
timesharing was electronic messaging or what is now commonly called 
email. Like chat, electronic messaging capitalized on the fact that time-
shared systems were supported and coordinated by a common, central 
computing machine. Unlike chat, however, electronic messaging provided 
for a form of asynchronous communication. Katie Hafner and Matthew 
Lyon provide a succinct description of the operation of such systems in 
their examination of the origins of email: 
Researchers on the same time-sharing system each had a designated file, like 
an in-box, in the central machine. Colleagues could address short electronic 
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messages to someone else’s in-box, where only the recipient could read them. 
Messages could be dropped and picked up at any time. It was convenient, 
given the odd hours people kept. People within a single lab sent parades of 
one-liners back and forth, as well as longer memoranda and drafts of papers. 
(Hafner and Lyon 1996: 190)
Employed in this fashion, the mainframe computer functioned as an auto-
mated message processing and distribution system, operating in ways that 
were similar to conventional forms of inter-office mail. The first electronic 
message program was called MAILBOX and was installed in the early 
1960s on a timeshared mainframe at MIT. Like chat, this early email 
program was not developed by the manufacturers of the hardware and 
software; it too was hacked together post hoc by users and administrators 
of timeshared systems.
The use of the computer as a form of both synchronous and asynchro-
nous communication expanded with experiments in computer networking 
and the development of ARPANET, the precursor to the Internet. In 1968, 
J.C.R. Licklider and Robert W. Taylor published an influential and presci-
ent article in the April edition of International Science and Technology. This 
article, ‘The Computer as a Communication Device,’ not only espoused the 
advantages of communicating through timeshared mainframes but pro-
jected the benefits of expanding these various forms of ‘computer-aided 
communication’ to multi-machine computer networks. Although Licklider 
and Taylor had only experimented with a single machine coordinating 
communication across a room, they predicted that the same principles and 
results would apply to communication between individuals thousands of 
miles apart (Licklider and Taylor 1999: 97). Proof of their concept was 
provided three years later with the Emergency Management Information 
Systems And Reference Index (EMISARI). Murray Turoff, who oversaw 
the development and implementation of this computerized conferencing 
system for the US Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), described 
EMISARI as a ‘computer-mediated communication system for dispersed 
human groups’ (Hiltz and Turoff 1978: 43). The system provided three 
ways for users to communicate with each other: ‘One, called “Party Line,” 
was a simultaneous written conversation for up to 15 persons … The 
other was “Discussion,” which kept a permanent record in the computer 
of all entries made by participants, who were not on simultaneously. The 
third was messages among the contacts, which could also be attached to 
specific data items on tables as footnotes’ (Hiltz and Turoff 1978: 55). 
With these three kinds of user interaction, EMISARI provided participants 
with synchronous and asynchronous communication over a dedicated 
computer network.
In the same year that EMISARI came online, Ray Tomlinson, an 
engineer in the employ of Bolt Baranek and Newman, created the first 
inter-machine email program, successfully passing an electronic message 
between two PDP-10 minicomputers. Electronic messaging in a time-
shared system was possible because different users shared the same machine 
and its operating system. Tomlinson’s innovation was to devise a method 
for transferring an electronic message from the file system of one 
machine to that of another, permitting users of different systems to 
ISCC_1.1_05_art_Gunkel_53-70.indd   56 9/8/09   12:17:52 PM
57Beyond mediation: thinking the computer otherwise
exchange messages. This basic email system was synthesized by combin-
ing an extant electronic message program (SNDMSG) with a file transfer 
program (CYPNET). In the process of experimenting with this, Tomlinson 
selected the now ubiquitous @ symbol to distinguish the name of an indi-
vidual user from that of the host computer s/he utilizes. Eventually 
Tomlinson used this email program to inform other researchers on 
ARPANET of the existence of the nascent email system and its mode of 
operation. Consequently, the first use of network email announced the 
system’s own existence (Campbell 1998: 3); the medium was, quite liter-
ally, the message. The application immediately caught on, and by 1974 it 
was estimated that 75 per cent of all traffic on ARPANET was email.
Communication through the instrumentality of the computer, whether 
in the form of synchronous or asynchronous exchange, has been desig-
nated by a number of different names. In ‘The Computer as Communication 
Device’, Licklider and Taylor (1999) advocated use of the term ‘computer-
aided communication’ (CAC), which they fashioned following the precedent 
established in the engineering community with computer-aided design 
(CAD) and computer-aided engineering (CAE). Other theorists and prac-
titioners have employed the compound ‘compunications’ (Oettinger 
1971), ‘computer-based communication’ (Vallee and Wilson 1976), and 
‘computerized communication’ (Rogers and Rafaeli 1985). Other candidates 
include Zbigniew Brzezinski’s neologism ‘technotronic’, which designates 
‘the impact of technology and electronics – especially in the area of com-
puters and communication’ (Brzezinski 1970: 9), and ‘telematique’, which 
was introduced by Alain Minc and Simon Nora in a 1978 report commis-
sioned by French President Giscard d’Estaing to identify the ‘increasing 
interconnection between computers and telecommunications’ (Nora and 
Minc 1980: 4). 
But the most popular and accepted appellation, especially in the United 
States, has been and continues to be ‘computer-mediated communica-
tion’. Despite its popularity, the exact origin and etymology of this phrase 
is not certain. What is known is that it begins to make an appearance in 
the mid- to late 1970s. In 1978, for example, Starr Roxanne Hiltz and 
Murray Turoff employed the term in their extended examination of com-
puterized conferencing, The Networked Nation: Human Communication via 
Computer. Although Hiltz and Turroff used the term ‘computer conferenc-
ing system’ (CCS) to name ‘any system that uses the computer to mediate 
communication among human beings’ (Hiltz and Turroff 1978: xix), they 
had also employed ‘computer-mediated communication’ as a generic 
designation for various forms of human communication via the computer, 
including, ‘computerized conferencing, computer assisted instruction, and 
home terminals from which white collar work can be done’ (Hiltz and 
Turroff 1978: 167).
The phrase ‘computer-mediated communication’ was elevated to 
the status of a technical term in Hiltz’s subsequent collaboration with Elaine 
Kerr, which was undertaken for the US government’s National Science 
Foundation. This 1981 study was expanded and published in 1982 under 
the title Computer-Mediated Communication Systems: Status and Evaluation. 
In this text, ‘computer-mediated communication’ was defined as ‘a new 
form of enhanced human communication’ (Hiltz and Kerr 1982: 3). 
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Essentially, computer-mediated communication means that large numbers 
of people in business, government, education, or at home can use the com-
puter to maintain continuous communication and information exchanges. 
More than a replacement for the telephone, mails, or face-to-face meetings, 
computer communication is a new medium for building and maintaining 
human relationships.
(Hiltz and Kerr 1982: ix) 
For Hiltz and Kerr, the specific technologies that make up this new medium 
of human interaction includes: ‘conferencing systems, electronic message 
systems, and general information-communication systems designed to sup-
port “knowledge workers”’ (Hiltz and Kerr 1982: 1). Consequently, Hiltz 
and Kerr’s ‘computer-mediated communication’ functions as a comprehen-
sive term, designating both synchronous and asynchronous forms of 
human communication through the instrumentality of the computer. 
Recent employments and characterizations of CMC have reiterated and 
solidified this general and instrumentalist definition. For Susan Herring, 
editor of one of the first published collection of essays addressing CMC, 
‘computer-mediated communication is communication that takes place 
between human beings via the instrumentality of computers’ (Herring 
1996: 1). And John December, editor of the now defunct Computer-Mediated 
Communication Magazine, answers the self-reflective question ‘What is 
CMC?’ with a similar definition: ‘Computer-mediated communication is a 
process of human communication via computers …’ (December 1997: 1).
Standard Operating Presumptions
In CMC the computer is defined and functions as a medium or instrument 
through which human users exchange messages and interact with one 
another. Situating the computer in this fashion is completely reasonable 
and has distinct theoretical and practical advantages. First, this approach 
locates the computer at an identifiable position within the process model 
of communication, which was initially formalized by Claude Shannon 
and Warren Weaver in The Mathematical Theory of Communication. 
According to Shannon and Weaver, communication is a dyadic process 
bounded, on the one side, by an information source or sender and, on the 
other side, by a receiver. These two participants are connected by a com-
munication channel or medium through which messages selected by the 
sender are conveyed to the receiver (Shannon and Weaver 1963: 7–8). 
This rudimentary model is not only ‘accepted as one of the main seeds 
out of which Communication Studies has grown’ (Fiske 1994: 6) but 
establishes the basic elements and parameters for future elaborations and 
developments. Although subsequent models, like those devised by George 
Gerbner (1956), B. H. Wesley and M. S. MacLean (1957), and Roman 
Jakobson (1960), extend and complicate Shannon and Weaver’s initial 
concept, they retain the basic elements of senders and receivers connected 
by a medium that facilitates the transmission of messages. In accordance 
with this model, CMC locates the computer in the intermediate position of 
channel or medium. As such, it occupies the position granted to other 
forms of communication technology and is comprehended as something 
through which human messages pass.
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Second, this intermediate position is substantiated and justified by the 
traditional understanding of the proper role and function of the techno-
logical apparatus. This can be seen, for example, in the work of Marshall 
McLuhan, the media theorist whose influence extends beyond traditional 
forms of media studies and into the new fields of CMC and cyberculture. 
For McLuhan, media – and the word ‘media’ encompasses a wide range of 
different technological devices, applying not just to the mechanisms of 
communication, like newspaper and radio, but all kinds of tools and 
instruments – are defined as ‘extensions of man.’ This is, of course, imme-
diately evident from the title of what is considered to be one of his most 
influential books, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. And the 
examples employed throughout this text are by now familiar: the wheel is 
an extension of the foot, the telephone is an extension of the ear, and the 
television is an extension of the eye (McLuhan 1995). Understood in this 
way, technical mechanisms are defined as prostheses through which 
various human faculties come to be extended beyond their original 
capacity or ability. In making this argument, McLuhan does not so much 
introduce a new understanding of media technology but provides explicit 
articulation of a decision that is itself firmly rooted in the soil of the 
Western tradition. The concept of technology, especially the technology of 
information and communication, as an extension of human capabilities is 
evident in and deployed by Plato’s Phaedrus, where writing had been 
addressed and debated as an artificial supplement for speech and memory 
(Plato 1982: 274b–276c). 
This particular understanding is also evident in Martin Heidegger’s The 
Question Concerning Technology: 
We ask the question concerning technology when we ask what it is. Everyone 
knows the two statements that answer our question. One says: Technology 
is a means to an end. The other says: Technology is a human activity. The 
two definitions of technology belong together. For to posit ends and procure 
and utilize the means to them is a human activity. The manufacture and 
utilization of equipment, tools, and machines, the manufactured and used 
things themselves, and the needs and ends that they serve, all belong to 
what technology is.
(Heidegger 1977: 4–5)
According to Heidegger’s analysis, the assumed understanding of any kind 
of technology, whether it be the product of handicraft or industrialized 
manufacture, is that it is a means employed by human users for specific 
ends. Heidegger terms this particular characterization ‘the instrumental 
definition’ and indicates that it forms what is considered to be the ‘correct’ 
understanding of any kind of technological innovation. As Andrew 
Feenberg summarizes it in the introduction to his Critical Theory of 
Technology, ‘the instrumentalist theory offers the most widely accepted 
view of technology. It is based on the common sense idea that technologies 
are “tools” standing ready to serve the purposes of users’ (Feenberg 1991: 5). 
And because a tool ‘is deemed “neutral,” without valuative content of its 
own’ (Feenberg 1991: 5) a technological instrument is evaluated not in 
and for itself, but on the basis of the particular employments that have 
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been decided by a human user. This verdict is succinctly articulated by 
Jean-François Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition: 
Technical devices originated as prosthetic aids for the human organs or as 
physiological systems whose function it is to receive data or condition the 
context. They follow a principle, and it is the principle of optimal performance: 
maximizing output (the information or modification obtained) and minimiz-
ing input (the energy expended in the process). Technology is therefore a 
game pertaining not to the true, the just, or the beautiful, etc., but to effi-
ciency: a technical ‘move’ is ‘good’ when it does better and/or expends less 
energy than another.
(Lyotard 1984: 44)
Lyotard’s evaluation begins by affirming the traditional understanding of 
technology as an instrument, prosthesis, or extension of human faculties. 
Given this ‘fact,’ which is stated as if it were something that is beyond 
question, he proceeds to provide an explanation of the proper place of the 
technological apparatus in epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. According 
to his analysis, a technological device, whether it be a cork screw, a clock, 
or a computer, does not in and of itself participate in the big questions of 
truth, justice, or beauty. Technology, on this account, is simply and indis-
putably about efficiency. A particular technological innovation is considered 
‘good,’ if, and only if, it proves to be a more effective means to accomplish-
ing a desired end.
Third, this instrumentalist understanding has been and remains largely 
unquestioned, because it constitutes what epistemologists routinely call 
‘normal science.’ The term ‘normal science’ was introduced by Thomas 
Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions to describe those undertak-
ings that are guided by an established and accepted paradigm. Paradigms, 
according to Kuhn, are ‘universally recognized scientific achievements 
that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions to a community of 
practitioners’ (Kuhn 1996: x).  Normal sciences, Kuhn demonstrates, have 
distinct theoretical and practical advantages.  Operating within the frame-
work of an established paradigm provides scholars with a common 
foundation and accepted set of basic assumptions.  This effectively puts 
an end to debates about fundamentals and allows researchers to concen-
trate their attention on problems defined by the discipline, instead of 
quibbling about competing methodological procedures or metaphysical 
substructures. For this reason, a paradigm provides coherent structure to 
a particular area of scientific research.  It defines what constitutes a prob-
lem for the area of study, delimits the kind of questions that are considered 
to be appropriate and significant, and describes what research procedures 
and resulting evidence will qualify as acceptable. When the computer is 
understood and examined as an instrument or medium facilitating human 
communication, research generally concentrates on either the quantity 
and quality of the messages that can be distributed by the system, or the 
kinds of relationships established between the senders and receivers 
through its particular form of mediation. 
In the first instance, investigators consider the messages that are and 
can be conveyed by the technologies of CMC. Such examinations include, 
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for example, linguistic studies of the evolving conventions of language, 
comparing use, style, and genera of online discourse to norms and proto-
cols described and predicted by various linguistic models and/or empirical 
studies of language. These investigations consider issues like the effect of 
CMC on language use and evolution (Baron 1984; Crystal 2006; 
Pemberton and Shurville 2000), the development of distinct forms of ‘electric 
language’ (Herring 1996: 13–28), and the invention, use, and acceptance 
of new linguistic components like emoticons :-), cyber-slang (flamming, 
lurking, spamming), and abbreviations and acronyms (BTW, LOL, etc.) 
(Jones 1995; Herring 1996: 47–64). Other forms of research address the 
perceived limitations and projected opportunities of online communica-
tion by comparing the information capacity of messages in CMC to that 
established by other forms of communication, most notably face-to-face 
interaction. These studies, which often rely on the theories of media rich-
ness (Daft and Lengel 1984; 1986) and social presence (Short et al. 1976), 
have produced interesting but varying results. Some conclude that CMC is 
less expressive than face-to-face interaction, arguing that computer gener-
ated messages lack both non-verbal cues and clear indication of social 
context (Sproull and Kiesler 1986). The majority, however, have demon-
strated that the same ‘deficiencies’ can often be a distinct advantage, 
because they foster forms of interaction that are significantly less inhib-
ited, hierarchical, or constrained (Hiltz and Turoff 1978; Hiltz and Kerr 
1981; Kiesler et al. 1984; Herring 1996: 65–80, 109–128, and 243–264). 
Finally, there are number of research projects that have looked at the 
actual composition of messages exchanged via network email, on IRC 
channels, in USENET discussions, or through bulletin board systems (BBS). 
These analyses consider the content of messages in synchronous and 
asynchronous CMC, and have discovered both interesting innovations 
(Wittig 1989; Dery 1994) and disturbing patterns of prejudice, and even 
forms of hate speech (Herring 1999; Nakamura 1999).
In the second instance, research is concerned not with the composi-
tion, limitations, benefits, or content of messages in CMC but with the 
effects such communication have on participants. This particular approach 
characterizes early forms of CMC research, which was organized around 
task-oriented examinations within specific organizational settings and 
questioned the effectiveness of synchronous and asynchronous computer-
based interaction for accomplishing specific objectives (Hiltz and Kerr 
1981; Hiltz and Turoff 1978; Lea and Spears 1991; Rice and Case 1983; 
Rubinyi 1989; Sproull and Kiesler 1986; Steinfield 1986). Such studies 
often compare the experiences and outcomes of computer-based discus-
sion and decision-making to other forms of communication in order to 
determine the relative effectiveness of the technology within the context 
of a specific occupation, work-group, or organization. Although such 
task-oriented examinations continue to be popular in organizational 
communication research, recent work has concentrated on the social 
aspects of CMC, investigating the relationships, communities, and cul-
tures that have been and may be fostered through the mediation of the 
computer. In this area, researchers have employed many of the tradi-
tional theoretical approaches developed in the sociology of communication 
and media studies. Scholars like, Furlong (1989), Koreman and Wyatt 
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(Herring 1996: 225–242), and Shaw (Jones 1997: 133–145), for example, 
have pursued uses and gratification studies, examining how different 
users (i.e. senior citizens, women, immigrants, gay men, etc.) employ the 
technology of CMC and what they perceive the benefits and shortcomings 
of computer-mediated interaction to be. Others investigate the formation, 
development, and struggles of online or virtual communities (Gumpert 
and Drucker 1992; Herring 1996: 265–278; Jones 1995: 138–163; 
Rheingold 1993; Wood and Smith 2001) and the various forms of social 
behavior and modes of conflict resolution deployed within these cyber-
societies (Holt 2004; Jones 1997: 206–235 and 146–168). There have 
also been ethnographic examinations of specific virtual cultures (Herring 
1996: 173–186; Jones 1997: 55–79); investigations of the limits of trust, 
the construction of identity, and the complications of self-disclosure 
(Bruckman 1999; Gratz and Salm 1984; Stone 1995; Turkle 1995); and 
theoretical and practical considerations of what is perhaps the most 
extreme form of computer-mediated, human interaction – virtual sex, tel-
edildonics, and tiny sex (Branwyn 1993; Gumpert 1990; Herring 1996: 
129–146; Rheingold 1993; Stone 1995; Van Gelder 1990).
Beyond Mediation
In CMC, the computer is determined to be, in both name and function, 
an instrument or medium through which human interlocutors exchange 
information and interact. Understanding the computer in this fashion is 
technically justified and possesses distinct theoretical and practical 
advantages for students and scholars. And in being situated in this fash-
ion, the computer is easily accommodated to and made to function in 
accordance with the dominant paradigm of media studies as it has been 
practiced throughout the second half of the twentieth century. This 
approach, however, also entails a set of unacknowledged presupposi-
tions that necessarily complicate this highly specific formulation and 
ultimately enervate its procedures and significance. In CMC research 
the computer is effectively immaterial. In fact, CMC is not about compu-
ter technology at all. Understood as an instrument through which 
human users interact, the computer recedes from view and becomes a 
more or less transparent medium of message exchange. According to 
Cathcart and Gumpert, studies of communication have always and 
 necessarily:
minimized the role of media and channel in the communication process. The 
focus has been on the number of participants, source and receiver relation-
ships, and forms and functions of messages. The media of communication 
have been accepted, more or less, as fixed or neutral channels for the trans-
mission of messages among participants. 
(Cathcart and Gumpert 1981: 27)
This form of instrumental transparency, however useful and convenient, 
is necessarily interrupted and even resisted by the mechanisms and 
machinery of computing. Technically speaking, the computer, whether a 
timeshared mainframe, a networked PC, or something else (i.e., cellphone, 
handheld device, etc.), has never been a fixed or neutral channel through 
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which human interaction takes place. Frederick Williams pointed this out 
as early as 1982: 
The computer is the first communications technology to interact intellectu-
ally with its users. Most technologies only transform light, sound, or data 
into electronic impulses for transmission, then reverse the process at the 
receiving end. Computers, by contrast, can accept or reject our messages, 
reduce or expand them, file them, index them, or answer back with their 
own messages. 
(Williams 1982: 30)
A similar remark was recorded by Ithiel de Sola Pool in the foreword to 
Wilson Dizard’s The Coming Information Age:
Prior to the computer, every communication device took a message that had 
been composed by a human being and (with some occasional loss) delivered 
it unchanged to another human being. The computer for the first time pro-
vides a communication device by which a person may receive a message 
quite different from what any human sent. 
(Pool 1985: xi–xii) 
And Cathcart and Gumpert drew a similar conclusion: 
For the first time, a technology can not only speed and expand message 
exchange, but it can also respond with its own message to a human partner. 
The computer in this mode becomes a proxy for a sender-receiver in the 
communication dyad. 
(Cathcart and Gumpert 1985: 116)
For Williams, de Sola Pool, and Cathcart and Gumpert, the computer can-
not simply be reduced to the customary instrument of communication. 
Although other devices may function appropriately as a kind of technical 
intermediary through which human beings exchange messages, the com-
puter deviates from this expectation and interrupts its procedure. Instead 
of functioning as a virtually immaterial and transparent channel through 
which human agents exchange messages, the computer participates in 
and contaminates the process. It acts on the messages, significantly alters 
them, and delivers information that was not necessarily selected, composed, 
or even controlled by human participants. These various involvements 
cannot be reduced to a form of unintentional noise introduced by the 
exigencies of the channel, which is precisely how the process models 
have dispensed with and accounted for this kind of machinic contribution. 
As Chesebro and Bonsall point out, ‘other communication technologies 
may affect the substantive meaning of a human message, but the altera-
tion is typically an unintended by-product of the medium. The computer, 
on the other hand, is employed because it will reformat the ideas con-
tained in a human message’ (Chesebro and Bonsall 1989: 31). With the 
other media of communication (i.e., print, telegraph, telephone, radio, tel-
evision, etc.), changes in the human-generated message are explained as 
unintentional noise imparted by the instrument of transmission. With the 
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computer, such alterations cannot be reduced to mere noise. They are 
necessary and integral elements of its function. 
The computer, therefore, substantively resists being exclusively defined 
as a medium and instrument through which human users exchange mes-
sages. Instead, it actively participates in communicative exchanges as a 
kind of additional agent and/or (inter)active co-conspirator. Defined in 
this fashion, the computer may not be reduced to an instrument or 
medium of communication but occupies, to varying degrees of success, 
the position of an other within a communicative exchange. Already in 
1966, for instance, Joseph Weizenbaum exhibited ELIZA, a rather simple 
computer program that was arguably capable of passing the Turing Test 
for machine intelligence (Turing 1999) by entering into what appeared to 
be intelligent conversation with a human user (Weizenbaum 1976). A 
more recent, if not somewhat ironic, example can be found in the circula-
tion of unwanted email or spam. Spam messages, which inform Internet 
users of everything from herbal supplements, which enhance the size and 
operation of various parts of the body, to bogus stock and investment 
opportunities, are generated by and originate with a computer. As a result of 
the seemingly unrestrained proliferation of this kind of machinic generated 
messages, users and network administrators now employ spam filters, 
which effectively decide which messages to deliver to the human user and 
which ones to filter out. In the era of spam, email is no longer an exclusive 
instrument of human communication but shows signs of increasing 
involvement by machines in the communicative process.
Conclusions and Consequences
So what does this all mean? First, it marks the end of media studies as we 
have known and practiced it. We need, however, to be cautious with how 
we understand and employ the word ‘end’ in this particular context. In 
the field of media studies, the operative paradigm, as we have seen, situ-
ates technology as a tool or instrument of message exchange between 
human users. This particular understanding has been codified by the 
dominant forms of communication theory, has guided the customary 
practices of media studies research, and has been considered normal and 
virtually beyond question by a particular community of scholars. Because 
this conceptualization is accepted as normative, the computer and other 
forms of information technology have, with some notable success, been 
accommodated to fit the dominant paradigm. And this success is clearly 
evident by the phenomenal growth of CMC as a recognized area of investi-
gation, and the institutionalization of CMC within professional organizations, 
university curricula, and scholarly journals. At the same time, however, 
it is increasingly clear that the computer does not behave according to this 
paradigmatic structure and effectively challenges long standing assump-
tions about the role and function of technology. The computer, therefore, 
constitutes what Kuhn would call an ‘anomaly’ (Kuhn 1996: 52) – some-
thing that does not quite fit with the dominant paradigm and that calls 
into question its assumptions and structure. For this reason, the computer 
is not necessarily a new technology to be accommodated to the theories 
and practices of media studies as it is currently defined but introduces 
significant challenges to the standard operating procedures of media 
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studies research, initiating what Kuhn calls a ‘paradigm shift.’ What is at 
an end, therefore, is not media studies per se but the dominant paradigm 
that has, until now, structured and guided both the theories and practices 
of media studies. And it is this shift in paradigm that is announced and 
marked by the moniker Media Studies 2.0.
Second, a new paradigm, especially during the time of its initial 
appearance and formulation, does not simply replace, reject, or invali-
date the preceding one. For this reason, the previous paradigm, although 
clearly in something of a state of crisis, can still be useful, albeit in a 
highly restricted capacity and circumscribed situation. Within Newtonian 
physics, for example, what is true and what is false, is determined by the 
entities, rules, and conditions that come to be exhibited within the 
Newtonian system. As long as one operates inside the framework or 
‘paradigm’ of this system, it is possible to define what is and what is not 
valid for the Newtonian characterization of physical reality. All this 
changes, of course, when the normal functioning of Newtonian science 
is confronted with an alternative, like that formulated by Albert Einstein. 
Einstein’s innovations, however, do not invalidate or foreclose Newtonian 
physics. They simply reinscribe Newton’s laws within a different context 
that reveals other entities, rules, and conditions that could not be con-
ceptualized as such within the horizon of Newton’s theorizing. In an 
analogous way, the change in paradigm that is announced by Media 
Studies 2.0 does not disprove or simply put an end to CMC research as 
such. Instead it redefines CMC as a highly specific and restricted case of 
what needs to be a much more comprehensive understanding of the role 
and function of technology within communication. This should come as 
no surprise to media studies scholars. In fact, we already know this and 
currently operate within this Kuhnian perspective, even if we do not 
acknowledge it as such. From the innovative work of Marshall McLuhan 
(1995) to Nicholas Negroponte’s Being Digital (1995), and Jay David 
Bolter and Richard Grusin’s Remediation (1999), media scholars have 
affirmed time and again the apparently indisputable fact that new media 
do not so much eradicate previous media technology but relegate these 
existing forms to new positions and functions within the newly defined 
system. We just have not applied this particular insight about the his-
torical development of media to the development of the field of media 
studies itself.
Finally, although the computer challenges the current paradigm, plac-
ing its normal functioning in something of a crisis, what comes next, that 
is the new paradigm, is only now beginning to make an appearance. And 
if the history of science is any indication, it may be quite some time before 
these innovations come to be formulated and codified into the next itera-
tion of what will be ‘normal science.’ At this preliminary stage, however, 
we can begin to identify some aspects of what the next generation in 
media studies might look like in the wake of this paradigmatic shift. For 
now, the shape of this new paradigm is, for better or worse, influenced (or 
clouded) by the current paradigm, which provides the only conceptual 
apparatus and vocabulary we have at our disposal. We are, therefore, in 
the somewhat cumbersome situation of trying to articulate what will 
exceed the current paradigm by employing the words and concepts that it 
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already defines and regulates. This will, of course, affect what can be said 
about the new paradigm, but we have no other way by which to proceed. 
From what we already know, it is clear that it is no longer accurate to 
define computer technology exclusively as an instrument that is to be 
animated and used, more or less responsibly, by a human being. The 
computer is beginning to be understood as an Other – another kind of 
communicative Other – who confronts human users, calls to them, and 
requires an appropriate response. This other aspect of the computer, as 
we have seen, was predicted by Cathcart and Gumpert back in 1985. 
Media studies scholars, however, had (for reasons that are both under-
standable and justifiable) ignored it, because it did not fit the established 
paradigm of media studies scholarship – what can, in retrospect, be called 
‘Media Studies 1.0.’ In reframing the machine according to the stipula-
tions of this other and virtually forgotten alternative, all kinds of things 
change, not the least of which is our understanding of who, or what, 
qualifies as a legitimate social actor. For Norbert Wiener, the progenitor 
of the science of cybernetics, these developments fundamentally alter the 
social landscape:
It is the thesis of this book [The Human Use of Human Beings] that society can 
only be understood through a study of the messages and the communication 
facilities which belong to it; and that in the future development of these mes-
sages and communication facilities, messages between man and machines, 
between machines and man, and between machine and machine, are des-
tined to play an ever-increasing part. 
(Wiener 1988: 16) 
In the social relationships of the not-too-distant future (we need to recall 
that Wiener wrote this in 1950), the computer will no longer comprise 
an instrument or medium through which human users communicate 
with each other. Instead it will occupy the position of another social 
actor with whom one communicates and interacts. In coming to occupy 
this other position, one inevitably runs up against and encounters fun-
damental questions of social responsibility and ethics – questions that 
not only could not be articulated within the context of the previous 
paradigm, but if they had been articulated, would have been, from that 
perspective, considered inappropriate and even nonsense. What, for 
example, is our responsibility in the face of this Other – an Other who is 
otherwise than another human entity? How do or should we respond to 
this other form of Otherness, and how will or should this machinic Other 
respond to us? Although these questions appear to open onto what 
many would consider to be the realm of science fiction, they are already 
part of our social reality. The vast majority of information currently 
exchanged on the Internet is not human-to-human communication via 
the instrumentality of the computer network. It is not what we com-
monly understand and study as CMC. The majority of traffic is otherwise; 
it is human-to-machine and machine-to-machine communication. 
Consequently, we already live and operate in a 2.0 world. It is only our 
theorizing that lags behind and remains committed to outdated models 
and methodologies. 
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